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Introduction
Climate change is closely related to the rise of the global economysince the industrial revolution. As scientific evidence shows, the in-creased concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is attrib-
utable to human activities since WWII, leading to global warming, rising sea
levels, and more frequent occurrences of extreme weather. (1) Scientists
warned that immediate action must be taken by the international commu-
nity if we are to stop the globe from warming more than 2oC above pre-in-
dustrial levels and avoid catastrophic ecological consequences. The recent
Paris Climate Summit from 30 November to 12 December 2015, officially
referred to as the 21st Conference of Parties (COP 21) under the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), was an impor-
tant part of the international efforts to tackle climate change. Over the past
few decades, the international community has been working together to
better understand the extent of climate change and what actions are re-
quired to mitigate it. These efforts were crystallised in the establishment of
the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 with the
mandate to assess the state of climate change, and the signing of the UN-
FCCC in 1992, which laid the foundation for further international coopera-
tion. (2) The Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which required developed countries to
reduce greenhouse gas emission, was an historic international agreement on
climate change. Nevertheless, it did not bear much fruit without the partic-
ipation of the United States. For this reason, many observers called for a new
international agreement to be reached as a matter of urgency. The COP 21
in Paris was therefore highly anticipated. Prior to the conference, each par-
ticipant country was invited to make pledges of carbon emission reduction
according to their respective capabilities, known as “Intended Nationally De-
termined Contributions” (INDC). Although some NGO studies doubt the ef-
fectiveness of the INDCs to limit the world temperature increase to less than
2oC, (3) the bottom-up approach implied by the concept of INDC is seen as
more practical and promising to the climate change problem. (4) As the
world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases and the world’s second largest
economy, China has become an important force that heavily influences the
failure or success of cooperation on climate change. In the following, I would
like to discuss the role of China in the making of the Paris Agreement, the
reasons for China’s active role in forging international cooperation on climate
change, and the challenges it faces in taking action against climate change.
China and the Paris Climate Summit
Since the start of international cooperation on climate change, China has
undergone tremendous changes in many respects. Economic reform has in-
creased China’s trade with the outside world. Its accession to the World
Trade Organisation (WTO) made China the “World’s Factory” and helped it
accumulate unprecedented wealth. In tandem with its economic achieve-
ments, the volume of carbon emission increased exponentially for China,
and it has surpassed the United States as the world’s largest carbon emitter
since 2005 (see Graph 1).
From the perspective of China’s leaders in the 1990s, environmental degra-
dation was a necessary price to pay in order to alleviate large-scale poverty.
As a corollary, China was not supposed to cut carbon emission levels, and
developed countries were to contribute to the transfer of technology to de-
veloping countries so as to facilitate the control of global carbon emission. (5)
China’s leaders were also cautious about the possibility of foreign powers
attempting to interfere in China’s domestic affairs in the name of environ-
mental protection. (6)
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Since the 2000s, tensions have developed between China’s position on its
global environmental obligations and the expectations of the international
community. The crux of the issue was how to assign fairly the responsibility
of carbon emission reduction between developed countries and China with
its fast-growing economy. Some critics from the United States argue that
China’s efforts have not matched its increased economic strength and cor-
responding responsibility for climate change. (7) At the Copenhagen Confer-
ence in 2009 (COP 15), China was also accused of blocking a more
substantial agreement from being reached. (8)
The tide changed in this round of climate talks. China was lauded by both
the domestic and foreign press for its active and constructive role in bringing
the Paris Climate Summit to fruition. (9) At the decision-making level, leaders
of both China and the United States exhibited leadership in making a deal
possible in Paris. At the working level, the Chinese negotiators united with
the French and the Americans to clear away some of the doubts expressed
in discussion and make agreement a genuine option. (10)
China’s intention to seal a meaningful deal in Paris actually became
apparent in its climate diplomacy ahead of the conference. For one
thing, China has engaged in a number of bilateral agreements on climate
change and clean energy with Germany, the United Kingdom, France,
India, and more importantly, the United States. (11) Given the previous
standoffs between China and the US at COP 15, the Sino-US Joint An-
nouncement on Climate Change in November 2014 and the Sino-US
Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change in October 2015 laid
significant groundwork for the Paris talks. Their milestone cooperation
was realised by a major shift in the domestic politics of the two coun-
tries in favour of carbon emission cuts. (12) In relation to the Paris Climate
Summit, China also submitted INDC of its own, which detailed reduction
targets and reaffirmed its intention to peak carbon emissions by 2030
and to reduce carbon intensity by 60-65% from 2005 levels. (13) More-
over, cooperation on climate change is taking place between city-level
governments. For example, 11 Chinese provinces and cities collaborated
with 18 cities in the US to devise an action plan for carbon emission re-
duction before the Paris talks. (14) Besides intergovernmental cooperation,
China also joined hands with international billionaires such as Bill Gates
to invest more in research on clean energy. (15) In sum, international co-
operation among various levels of the Chinese government and across
various sectors has made important breakthroughs in the spirit of the
Paris Conference. Qi Ye and Tong Wu from the Brookings-Tsinghua Center
positively evaluated China’s efforts and contended that China is ready
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to take up its role as a “proactive builder” in global climate gover-
nance. (16)
Despite China’s activity and its cooperation with the United States ahead
of the conference, divisions remained between developed countries led by
the United States and developing countries represented by China and India.
Xie Zhenhua 解振華, China’s chief negotiator at the Paris Climate Summit,
had emphasised that China’s position was to secure an agreement that
would provide a mechanism to tackle climate change after the Kyoto Pro-
tocol expires in 2020, to confirm the international commitment to the tran-
sition to low-carbon development, and to resolve the issue of funding and
technology transfers, which concerned developing countries the most. (17)
More importantly, China wanted to uphold the principle of “Common but
Differentiated Responsibility” (CBDR) that underlies the principle of fairness
and national contribution according to respective capabilities.
During the Paris Climate Summit, China and India maintained that devel-
oped countries should make deeper cuts in carbon emissions before China
and India made further promises on carbon emission reduction, worrying that
any other arrangement would impair their right to economic growth relative
to developed countries. In addition, China also demanded that developed
countries honour their pledges to climate finance, and insisted that the agree-
ment should uphold the principle of CBDR as extensively as possible. (18)
Ultimately, the Paris Climate Summit resulted in a legally binding consensus
by 195 participant countries on limiting global warming to 2oC above pre-
industrial levels by the end of this century, with an aim to reduce it to 1.5oC.
In the parts that were agreed upon but not legally binding, participant coun-
tries also agreed to review the respective INDC every five years as a way of
monitoring the effectiveness of carbon emission reduction on a global scale.
In addition, the developed countries promised to discuss a roadmap to boost
climate finance to US$ 100 billion per year by 2020 in order to help devel-
oping countries mitigate and adapt to the impact of climate change. (19) On
the one hand, the Paris Agreement has been largely regarded as historic. On
the other hand, some critics such as Bjørn Lomborg, the director of the
Copenhagen Consensus Center, cast doubt over the credibility of participant
countries in their pledges of voluntary contribution, warning that hypocrisy
could result if words are not matched with real action. (20)
The final outcome of the Paris Agreement seems to suggest that China has
made its voice heard, and it appears to have played an indispensable role in
reaching the Agreement. As Arthur Mol and Neil Carter from the University
of York and the Wageningen University respectively predicted, in tandem
with China’s deeper integration with the international community, it is un-
avoidable for China to play a bigger role in environmental negotiations and
to exercise greater power to direct the outcomes. (21) Nevertheless, it would
be speculative to say that China’s role in the Agreement can be interpreted
as having far-reaching implications for its ascendance on the international
stage. China’s constant violations of international treaties in the area of
human rights protection continue to make the country a target of interna-
tional criticism. (22) In the Paris talks, some Chinese delegates admitted that
they needed to find a better way to communicate the country’s position
with other participants and improve China’s international standing. (23)
China’s domestic problems and global
climate change
From the preceding discussion, it is evident that China has made a sub-
stantial commitment to the goal of climate change mitigation over the past
years. Given the public-good nature of climate change, China’s active par-
ticipation in the global climate change issue warrants deeper analysis. Apart
from the international pressure for China to be a “responsible power” 
(fuzeren daguo負責任大國), China’s interests in climate change mitigation
concurrently lie in its own needs to solve the domestic environmental prob-
lems caused by the three decades of rapid and high-growth-led economic
development as well as the quest for sustainable economic growth with se-
cure energy resources.
In the Mao era, the environment was not viewed as an object to be pro-
tected but rather as a resource to be exploited for economic growth and
political campaigns. This resulted in large-scale environmental degradation
such as serious soil erosion, more frequent flooding, shortage of arable land
and water, as well as a wide range of environmental pollution. The extent
of environmental degradation raised concern in the late 1970s, but eco-
nomic development was still regarded as more important than environmen-
tal protection to any effective degree. (24) The Chinese public’s tolerance for
environmental problems has nevertheless decreased markedly, as reflected
in the rise of public protests against polluting projects across the country.
While the scale of these protests is usually limited, they have caused varying
levels of social unrest. (25) Furthermore, from the second half of the 1990s
onward, a growing body of journalistic and scholarly evidence has pointed
to the alarming consequences of the fast-growth economic strategy in
terms of human and environmental costs. This has led to an increasing
awareness at the level of the Chinese leadership of the need to counter en-
vironmental degradation.
In the late 1990s, the central government began to take environmental
issues more seriously and gradually balanced the importance of environ-
mental protection and the need for rapid economic growth. The National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the supra-ministry over-
seeing China’s comprehensive economic development, was assigned with
devising plans for sustainable development starting in 1998. (26) Meanwhile,
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the State Environment Protection Administration (SEPA) was established
under the direct supervision of the State Council in 1998 in order to protect
the environment through the implementation of environmental policies
and to enforce relevant regulations such as those controlling air pollution.
To strengthen its role, SEPA later became one of the ministries of the State
Council and was renamed the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP)
in 2008. Control of air pollution and concern over climate change were also
salient in national plans since the mid-2000s. For example, in the 12th Five-
Year Plan (2011-2015), binding reduction targets were set for air pollutants
and were incorporated into the target responsibility system (mubiao zeren
zhi 目標責任制) to strengthen air pollution control at the local level. (27) “Cli-
mate change” also received unprecedented attention in the Plan and be-
came one of the main foci of environmental concern. (28)
Despite strengthened measures by the central government to improve air
quality in China, air pollution continues to haunt the country and areas be-
yond its borders. The severity of air pollution in China is partly attributed
to its heavy reliance on coal for energy generation. In recent years, more
than 60% of China’s coal consumption was for energy generation and con-
tributed significantly to China’s total carbon emission. (29) The process of
coal-burning releases airborne pollutants such as Particulate Matter 2.5
(PM2.5) as well as carbon dioxide, worsening not only the health of the Chi-
nese population but also the climate change problem. Around the time of
the Paris Climate Summit, northern China, including Beijing, was hit hard
by smog (wumai 霧霾) with a concentration of PM2.5 many times higher
than the limit set by the World Health Organisation (WHO). (30) Public dis-
content concerning air pollution was noticeable in both state and social
media. (31) The smog in Beijing then became the focal issue in a panel dis-
cussion at the summit, where chief negotiator Xie responded that solving
the climate change problem would have a complementary effect on smog
management. (32) The revised Air Pollution Prevention Law (daqi wuran
fangzhi fa 大氣污染防治法), which among other things aims at reducing
coal-related activities effective January 2015, is a case in point. (33) In sum,
China’s policy on climate change is concurrently driven by its urgent need
to control air pollutant emissions as well as maintaining social stability. 
In addition to its determination to clean the air, China has made remarkable
progress in the development of the renewable energy industry in the past
decade. In the 12th Five-Year Plan, the renewable energy industry was iden-
tified as a “pillar industry” of strategic importance. (34) Consequently, renew-
able energy quickly took up 25% of total national energy generation in 2015
from virtually nothing in 2005. (35) In recent years, China has also become
the world’s largest investor in renewable energy (see Graph 2) as well as the
largest generator (see Graph 3). (36) Thanks to China’s heavy investment in
the renewable energy sector, the cost of renewable energy has dropped sig-
nificantly on a global scale, (37) creating a favourable environment for deeper
carbon emission cuts through wider use of renewables. Also, wider adoption
of nuclear power in China is seen as integral to reducing national carbon
emission. (38) While China’s increased use of non-fossil-fuel energy sources
certainly helps reduce carbon emissions, John Mathews from the Macquarie
University points out that China’s heavy investment in renewables is driven
more by a focus on energy security and the perceived economic benefits of
renewable energy than by a concern for climate change. (39)
In 2014, China had the world’s third largest coal reserves and accounted
for the world’s largest coal production (46.9%). However, its huge appetite
for energy still outgrew its production and turned China into a net coal im-
porter to satisfy an additional 3.7% in its share of global coal consumption
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Graph 2 – Global New Investment in Renewable
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(50.6%). (40) The fact that China now relies on imports for its principal energy
source sheds light on its actions to diversify sources of energy into oil, nat-
ural gas, renewable energy, and nuclear power for energy security. This urge
has shifted China from its dependence on coal, further reducing the coun-
try’s total carbon emissions.
Policy implementation, law enforcement,
and environmental protection in China
The ambition shown by China’s leaders for green development is evident,
but the road is full of challenges. An important question to ask is how much
China’s leaders at the apex of the Chinese Communist Party are willing to
make the transition from carbon-intensive to low-carbon economy, and
how capable they are of overcoming obstacles in the process. While China
has a number of well-intentioned environmental plans and comprehensive
environmental laws in place, the real challenge remains the question of pol-
icy implementation and law enforcement. (41) More specifically, it is impor-
tant to ask how central-level officials can effectively tackle the vested
interests entrenched in local governments and initiate reforms in state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) related to sectors with high carbon emissions. 
Since political decentralisation and economic marketization, local gov-
ernments are closely allied with business interests for rapid economic
growth without due diligence regarding the environmental costs. (42) While
local governments are granted greater autonomy to set environmental pri-
orities and strategies to meet local environmental needs, environmental
protection is in reality neglected by local policymakers because local gov-
ernments are dependent on local industries for lucrative revenue, and local
Party cadres are chiefly evaluated for career promotion based on how much
GDP growth they can produce within a short time span. (43) Furthermore, in
the decentralised state apparatus, local environmental protection bureaus
are dependent on local government for finance, and local environmental
officials are also evaluated by local leaders for career promotion. In fear of
undermining the business interests crucial to the local governments, local
environmental officials do not favour stringent implementation of environ-
mental policies, nor are local judicial systems effective or their judges active
in enforcing environmental laws for the same reasons. (44) While national
campaigns against violation of environmental laws are carried out from
time to time, the effectiveness of those campaigns is largely contingent upon
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Graph 3 – Energy supply from renewables by country from 2005 to 2013 (unit: tonne of oil equivalent, TOE)
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the struggle between national environmental authorities and local state in-
terests. (45) Similarly, national authorities also have difficulty accurately au-
diting the carbon emissions figures submitted by local authorities. (46) The
conflict of interest in environmental protection between the national and
local governments must be tackled more effectively if China’s commitment
to climate change mitigation is not to be turned into an empty slogan.
Moreover, the transition to a low-carbon economy unavoidably requires
the cooperation of state-owned enterprises, which can no longer do high-
polluting business as usual. In the past, SOEs in the energy sector con-
tributed to environmental pollution by failing to meet environmental
standards in executing projects. (47) Also, many highly polluting industries
such as steel manufacturing ignored environmental regulations under the
protection of local vested interests, making the MEP a “toothless tiger.” (48)
As such, restructuring SOEs in line with national environmental targets will
be crucial for the success of climate change policies in China. 
Concluding remarks
To conclude, China has shown its willingness to cooperate on climate
change as exhibited in the Paris Agreement. China’s active participation
in climate change mitigation in recent years can be attributed to its own
need to solve domestic environmental problems and also to diversify its
energy supply. While China’s central government has a major stake in
controlling air pollution and achieving energy security, both of which are
conducive to climate change abatement, the delay in restructuring the
political and economic interests of local governments and SOEs could
impede the effectiveness of national targets for carbon emission reduc-
tion. Therefore, China’s actions to undertake reforms in these two areas
are inseparable from its commitment to climate change mitigation in
the post-COP 21 era. The timely economic slowdown since mid-August
2015 could provide a perfect opportunity for China to do so in the near
future.
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